Combat Engineers: Are They A Viable Asset In Today's Environment AUTHOR Major Frank A. Panter Jr, USMC CSC 1990 SUBJECT AREA Strategic Issues EXECUTIVE SUMMARY TITLE: COMBAT ENGINEERS: ARE THEY A VIABLE ASSET IN TODAY'S ENVIRONMENT? I. Purpose: To examine the role of the combat engineer as a key contributor for enhancing mobility, countermobility and survivability in Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF) operations. II. Problem: Today's environment of quickly changing threats, force reductions and decreased military budgets makes combat effectiveness even more difficult to achieve for the MAGTF. The challenge for the Marine Corps today is to meet threats across the entire spectrum of conflict with current or decreased assets. Maximizing the combat effectiveness of our Combined-Arms Teams in today's changing environment in areas related to mobility, countermobility and survivability must be re-examined. The role of the combat engineer as a key contributor for enhancing these capabilities must be revisited. To be a viable MAGTF asset, the GCE commander must know what combat engineer capabililties should be considered in his planning process. III. Data: Historically, the combat engineer role on the battlefield--to improve ground force mobility and to impede enemy movement--has not changed. The combat engineer, or "sapper," must still enhance friendly force capability to put armor and infantry on the objective and deny enemy forces from it. The organic engineer support resident in the Marine Division, the Combat Engineer Battalion, should be a major concern to the GCE commander for enhancement of mobility, countermobility and survivability on the battlefield. In the discussion of offensive, defensive and special environmental operations, tasks are identified that the combat engineers should perform which will increase the GCE's effectiveness. There is ample historical evidence of combat engineers being key contributors to combined-arms teams. The value of having combat engineers was recently endorsed by the Commandant when he expressed his desire to bring back the fourth combat engineer company out of cadre status. IV. Conclusions: The fundamental combat engineer role has not changed. What has changed is the magnitude and speed with which engineering missions must be accomplished in order to keep pace with the tactical employment of modern weapons systems. Equipment such as the armored excavator is needed to allow the combat engineer to contribute his full potential to the MAGTF mission. May it be low, medium or high intensity warfare, the employment of combat engineers can enhance mobility, countermobility and survivability on the battlefield. COMBAT ENGINEERS: ARE THEY A VIABLE ASSET IN TODAY'S ENVIRONMENT? OUTLINE Thesis: The role of the combat engineer as a key contributor for enhancing mobility, countermobility and survivability in MAGTF operations must be revisited, for properly employing the combat engineer as a combat multiplier enables the commander to master time and terrain. I. Combat Engineers A. Present-day Role B. Historical Role II. Offensive Operations A. Engineer Reconnaissance B. Placement in Battle Formations C. Soviet WWII Examples D. Maintaining MSRs E. Offensive Countermobility Operations F. Engineers Used as Deception III. Defensive Operations A. Iwo Jima Fortifications B. Obstacle Planning Considerations C. Rommel's Use of Obstacles D. Natural Obstacles IV. Special Environment Operations A. Deserts B. Mountain Warfare 1. Korean War C. Jungles D. Cold Weather E. Urban Warfare V. Future of Combat Engineers A. Spectrum of War B. Viable Asset COMBAT ENGINEERS: ARE THEY A VIABLE ASSET IN TODAY'S ENVIRONMENT? Warfighting is not only shooting. It is a multitude of actions, like delivering a message through an area infested by enemy forces, bringing ammunition forward along a road under enemy artillery fire, manning a roadblock, serving hot chow, taking care of the wounded or breaching a minefield.1 When such functions are performed properly, combat effectivness is enhanced and the combat commander is better able to impose his will on the enemy. The Marine Corps' ability to rapidly project a self- sustaining, task organized force capable of conducting a wide range of warfighting functions has long made it the nation's force in readiness. But today's environment of quickly changing threats, force reductions and decreased military budgets makes combat effectiveness even more difficult to achieve for the Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF). The challenge for the Marine Corps today is to meet threats across the entire spectrum of conflict with current or decreased assets. Maximizing the combat effectiveness of our Combined-Arms Teams in today's changing environment in areas related to mobility, countermobility and survivability must be re-examined. The role of the combat engineer as a key contributor for enhancing these capabilities must be revisited, for properly employing the combat engineer as a combat multiplier enables the commander to master time and terrain. As the Marine Corps grew during World War II in size and complexibility, the engineer's job expanded more and more into a combat role, primarily in the area of assault breaching. The combat engineer added those tasks associated with direct participation in the assault, even though his equipment and organization still retained a strong service support orientation. Established in 1942, the "engineer service" expanded over 6000 percent during World War II, more than any other field in the Marine Corps.2 As the century progressed, the Marine Corps adapted its organization, tactics, weapons and concept of employment to include engineer capabilities for the purpose of meeting current and future threats. The engineer role evolved to four major areas of concern: mobility, counter-mobility, survivability and general engineer support. While the focus of this discussion will examine the potential of the Combat Engineer Battalion (CEB) located in the Marine Division, other MAGTF engineers contribute significant capability to the MAGTF. The Engineer Support Battalion (ESB) of the Force Service Support Group (FSSG) and the Marine Wing Support Squadron (MWSS) of the Marine Aircraft Wing bring the bulk of general engineering support and engineer reinforcing capability to the MAGTF arena. However, the organic engineer support resident in the Marine Division, or Combat Engineer Battalion, should be a major concern to the Ground Combat Element (GCE) for enhancement of mobility, countermobility and survivability. During the 17th century, seize engineers dug extended, narrow trenches, or saps, to approach an enemy's defensive position. The digging of these saps coined the word "sappers" which is known throughout the world's armies today as meaning combat engineers. The knowledge and skills of the sapper are nothing new. Sappers have a long tradition dating back to our own Revolutionary War. General George Washington recognized the value of sappers for enhancing mobility in the assault as indicated in his General Orders of 3 August 1779: "On a march, in the vicinity of an enemy, a detachment of sappers and miners shall be at the head of the column, directly after the Van Guard for the purpose of opening and mending the roads and removing obstruction."3 The fundamental role of the combat engineer on the battlefield--to improve the Ground Combat Element's (GCE) mobility and to restrict the enemy's movement--has not changed. The "sapper" must still enhance friendly force capability to put tanks and infantry on the objective and deny enemy forces from it. But how can the GCE commander put the combat engineers to optimum use during battle and what engineer capabilities should he consider in his planning process? Offense In offensive operations, it is vital for the commander to know the terrain over which he will fight. It is the engineer's responsibility to provide him with an analysis of the terrain which not only focuses on trafficability, but also identifies likely enemy obstacle locations. A thorough engineer battlefield assessment is essential in identifying where the enemy force is most vulnerable. Accurately predicting the enemy's obstacle emplacements facilitates attacks through gaps and against flanks, thus avoiding his strength. To gain this information requires reconnaissance from all elements on the battlefield, managed by the intelligence officer. Engineers should identify specific reconnaissance requirements and should be allowed to augment dismounted patrols and scouts to identify obstacle characteristics. The commander should concentrate his engineer force at the front of the movement to contact. Engineers with the covering force allow it to move through undefended obstacles and restrictions, while engineers with the advance guard allow it to fight through defended obstacles without reinforce- ments. Sufficient combat engineers must be available to the leading maneuver units to clear the way by spanning gaps and breaching or bypassing obstacles and fortified positions. When the attack has started, the maneuver element must maintain speed, surprise, vigilence and momentum to drive through the enemy defenses. Combat engineers, fighting as part of a combined arms team, should be positioned well forward in the attacking task force to enhance the maneuver's elements mobility.4 An example of this concept of employing combat engineers in the attack can be seen in mid-April 1945. Three Soviet "fronts" (army groups) began a strategic offensive operation to encircle and destroy defending German forces and seize Berlin. These Soviets were the veterans of nearly four years of war conducted on a scale and intensity that was unprece- dented. Among the hard lessons learned by the Soviets was the critical role played by engineer troops in large, combined arms operations. When the Berlin operation began on April 16, "front" engineers and supporting elements created 340 passages and removed over 70,000 mines. These assault groups, which typically included infantry, armor, and flame thrower units, supported the advance of "frontal" forces deep into enemy defenses and into the German capital. The Berlin Operation reflected the massive use of engineer troops that characterized Soviet combined arms operations by the end of the war. Some 84 engineer companies of the "front" constituted assault detachments and groups tasked to establish paths through minefields and obstacles for advancing infantry, armor and artillery units. As Soviet sources report, a concentration of 17 to 22 engineer companies per km of break-through frontage was typical by the war's end. After the war, there was an extensive Soviet study of engineer lessons learned from major World War II operations and the importance of large-scale engineer support in future nuclear or conventional NATO/Warsaw Pact conflicts was confirmed.5

Throughout an offensive operation, logistic support must be sustained. Combat engineers must open and maintain the trails and roadways needed to keep this support in pace with the movements of the maneuver force. When the 1st Cavalry Division was ordered to relieve the 26th Marines at Khe Sanh in the early part of 1968, the 11th Engineer Battalion proved to be a valuable asset. The opening of Highway 9 into the Khe Sanh Combat Base was completed on April 11 after the Marine engineers worked day and night to complete their task. In eleven days, they had reconstructed more than fourteen kilometers of road, repaired and replaced nine bridges and built seventeen bypasses to allow for the movement's much needed logistical support.6

While mobility of the force in offensive operations has first priority, countermobility operations are vital to help isolate the battlefield and protect the attacking force from enemy counterattacks. Obstacles provide flank protection and deny the enemy from counterattack routes. Engineer countermobility plans in the offense, however, must stress rapid emplacement and flexibility. Engineer support must keep pace and be prepared to emplace obstacles alongside the advancing forces. Time and resources do not permit engineers to develop the terrain's full defensive potential. When maneuver units halt during offensive operations, engineers must rapidly construct as many fighting positions as possible. They should improve existing terrain by cutting reverse slope firing shelves or slots when possible. Armored excavators would be ideal to use to construct these posi- tions. The speed to accomplish obstacle reduction missions and the construction of fighting positions can be increased while providing the engineer a degree of protection when employing an armored excavator. It remains to be seen if the much needed armored excavator the Marine Corps has in the FY 92 budget survives pending cuts. Although deception is a unit and not an engineer responsibility, the engineers can be used to construct phony fighting positions, minefields and bridges. Engineers are a scarce resource on the battlefield, and observations of both obvious engineer equipment and working parties transmit a message to the enemy that a potential offensive is forth- coming. As exhibited in 1973 during the Arab-Israeli War, the Egyptians used engineers to install nine fake bridges in support of their Suez Canal crossing. It could be speculated that if General Burnside had attempted such a deception on crossing the Rappahannock during the Battle of Fredericksburg, he could have avoided some of his casualties and gained a degree of surprise. Defense When transitioning from the offense to the defense, priority of engineer support shifts from mobility and countermobility to survivability and countermobility. Survivability is another role of combat engineers that demonstrates their force multiplier capabilities--in building protective shelters, in improving comouflage and in construct- ing fighting positions. The lethality and destructivensss that will be found on the modern battlefield gives emphasis to the need for survivability measures. When bunkers, pillboxes and other protective shelters are built, our infantry, command and control centers, and our weapons and targeting systems are less vulnerable. The availability of hardened defensive positions has been calcu- lated to increase survivability of the defender by 54 to 77 percent in personnal casualties and 34 to 118 percent in tank losses. The effectiveness of direct-fire weapons may rise by five to ten times when barriers and fortifications are used.7 The Marines that landed on Iwo Jima in 1945 had a full appreciation of the protection that hardened defensive positions offered. During the first eleven days of January, Army bombers hammered Iwo Jima in daylight with 15,000 tons of explosives. The battleship Indiana fired 1,300 sixteen-inch shells into the island in day long salvos. The same day, four cruisers slammed another 1,300 eight-inch rounds on the target, sweeping the beaches and Chidori Airfield from end to end. Air photos showed nearly five thousand craters on one square mile of rubbled terrain, and other attacks came daily from the sea or air until Marines hit the beaches on H-Hour on Feburary 19.8 But what was the ultimate result against the Japanese defensive positions? General Smith said the air strikes and Navy shelling were virtually meaningless and minced no words in his critique: "All this added up to a terrific total of destructive effort which the uninitiated might expect to blast any island off the military map, level every defense, no matter how strong, and wipe out the garrison, but nothing of this kind happended. Like the worm which becomes stronger the more you cut it up, Iwo Jima thrived on our bombardment. The airfields were kept inactive by our attacks and some installations were destroyed, but the main body of defenses not only remained physically intact but they strengthened markedly. Still another historical example of how hardened defensive positions can increase survivability was shown during World War I at the Battle of the Somme. Allied guns fired 1,508,657 shells in a pre-attack barrage that lasted five days and nights. The purpose of the barrage was to cut the German's barbed wire, smash their trenches and penetrate their dugouts. In fact, though, very little of the enemy's wire had been cut. As for vast German casualties, the majority of the defenders were unharmed, huddling safely 40 feet below ground in deep, bomb-proof bunkers to wait out the shellfire. Underground there were comfortable barracks, even dining rooms with panelled walls, plus electric lights, hospital wards, rails for ammunition trucks, and artillery observation posts.10 To construct these many complex Japanese and German defensive positions took a great deal of time, material and manpower. For proper preparations of defensive positions, engineers should be located with the maneuver force to begin the work as soon as possible and develop plans for the follow-on engineers. Engineer digging equipment should be quickly brought forward to assist the effort. The defense requires extensive amounts of Class IV, construction material, and Class V, demolition material, which must be ready to move forward in the logistical train. The GCE commander should expect his engineer to provide construction estimates for his defensive positions to include time, equipment, material and manpower required. In the defense, the primary intent of countermobility operations is to attack the enemy's ability to execute his plan. This is done by disrupting his combat formations, interfering with his command and control, and confusing his commanders to create a vulnerability that friendly forces can exploit. The secondary intent is to destroy or disable his vehicles. These missions are accomplished with an integrated system of tactical obstacles and fires. It is the engineer's task to assist the commander in identifying and determining the effectiveness of existing natural and cultural obstacles and where necessary, reinforce those areas that lack sufficient barriers in defensive preparations. When conducting obstacle planning during current and future planning, consideration must be given to the effects barrier emplacement will have on the commander's scheme of maneuver. The engineer can assist the commander in obstacle planning by providing advice and recommendations that support the scheme of maneuver in many ways. Some of the items that should be considered are as follows: (a) Consideration must be given as to the ease of breaching or bypassing an obstacle in the event of a counterattack by friendly forces. How quickly a bypass route can be improved or how quickly emplaced obstacles can be breached can be identified by the engineer. (b) Obstacles should not impede friendly supply lines in the battle area. Provisions must be made to allow lanes and/or gaps in obstacle plans to provide resupply. The engineer can provide advice on placement of lanes and alternative gaps and/or route improvement for supply lines. (c) Enemy breaching capabilities are of prime interest to the engineer. Attention must be given to force the enemy to commit his limited breaching resources so that they can be exposed to friendly fires. If the engineer is involved early in obstacle planning, he can make recommendations as to the extent of effort that should be expended to expose this enemy vulnerability. (d) Cross-country movement is a major concern of the commander even in the defense. Consideration must be given to soil trafficability, rock outcrops, permanent snow fields, river fording sites, landing zone sites, and many other potential maneuver restrictions. The engineer can make recommendations on the ability to improve or reinforce the terrain for friendly force movement. (e) The engineer can also give the commander advice on the required materials time needed and amount of equipment necessary to complete an effective obstacle plan.11 An example of how obstacles can be used to shape the battlefield was exhibited by Rommel during the Battle of El Alamein in World War II. The Germans were attempting to prevent the British from breaking through a 38-mile front between the sea and the Qattara Depression. The Panzerarmee Afrika had to create a fortress position that would prevent passage. But how was Rommel going to create a fortress position on a flat stretch of desert without the high ground that many military defenses require? Rommel's answer was the extensive use of minefields that were deeper, more intense and more ingeniously deceptive than have been used before in the war. Interesting enough, it was the strength of the British minefields that vitally hindered Rommel's own recent offensive at Alam el Halfa previously.12 Thousands upon thousands of mines were laid in the North African campaign by engineers on both sides. Cynics say that the presence of uncleared mines over the years altered certain social observances among the desert Arabs. Before the war, the husband rode or walked ahead of his wife, she following like a servant in his footsteps. The great expanses of mined areas and the possiblity of being blown up altered the family formation. Now the wife walks in front, serving as a human mine detector.13 Mines, of course, are not the only defensive obstacle the GCE commander can employ. The combat engineer can assist the commander in planning, constructing and emplacing at key locations log, steel, wire and concrete obstacles as well as anti-tank ditches. Also, natural obstacles reinforced with explosives and booby-traps can give the GCE commander valuable time against an advancing enemy. During the invasion of Normandy, the Germans used the hedgerows in the Caen region as very effective reinforced natural obstacles. Special Environment Operations Unfamiliar environmental conditions may require unique engineer support. Although combat engineer units should be capable of operating in a variety of conditions, environmental extremes usually require specialized techniques, procedures and equipment. Engineers must fully understand and use the advantages and disadvantges of five special environments: deserts, mountains, jungles, winter and urban areas. The vastness of the desert makes mobility a prime concern. Roads are usually scarce and primitive. If the GCE commander expands his engineer reconnaissance, he can better identify routes, existing obstacles and minefield locations. Engineers can also assist maneuver by improving the existing routes and bridging dry gaps. Of special concern is mud during rainy seasons. Simple gulley crossings and cross country movement may require bridging and route improvement efforts. Due to the speed with which mounted operations progress in desert terrain, the use of minefields is the primary means for creating obstacles. Other countermobility methods are generally not effective. Road craters, for example, usually are easy to bypass. Opportunities for bridge destruction are rare. Local materials for expedient obstacles are also scarce. The desert provides little cover and concealment from ground-based observers and even less from aircraft. Hull and turret defilade positions for tactical vehicles are essential. Earth moving equipment would be used extensively for preparation of position defenses. Mountain operations require a large number of combat engineers since considerable emphasis centers on routes of communication. Roads and trails in the mountains require an extensive amount of effort in construction, improvement and maintenance. Employment of demolitions and use of mines are particularly effective against the enemy's ability to move. Bridging operations, destruction and construction, become extremely important. In general, placement of engineers within movement columns is critical because they will be able to breach obstacles. During the mountain fighting in the Korea War, combat engineers provided invaluable mobility support as indicated by a 1st Marine Division veteran, ". . . he hadn't gone far when he heard from behind, `Stop! Stop! The road may be mined!' He held up an arm and led the column off the road and waited for the engineers to move up. They were there in a couple of minutes, found no mines, and the Marines again headed west. There was always a platoon of engineers near the front of the column, near the action. Often they did as much fighting as a rifle platoon. The only difference between the two was that the engineers figured they were learning a trade."14 In the jungle, good roads are rare and are usually narrow, winding and incapable of supporting sustained military traffic. Road construction and maintenance are the greatest concerns of engineers in jungle warfare. Road building can have significant tactical, operational and political aspects in the jungle. In a LIC environment, the establishment of a secure, reliable road network promotes communication and maneuver. Engineers are expected to construct landing zones and airstrips in remote areas of the jungle in support of tactical operations. Much of the same equipment and techniques in constructing and draining roadways are applicable in constructing jungle landing zones and airstrips. Antipersonnel mines and booby traps are used extensively because of the heavy use of dismounted infantry. The combat engineer can train the infantry in countermine techniques as well as assist in breaching and emplacing them. In cold weather operations, the engineer is faced with a new set of problems. During heavy snowfalls, engineers' snow removal capability will be necessry to clear MSRs, landing zones and airstrips. In remote northern regions, satisfactory pioneer roads may have to be constructed by grading and compacting existing snow. Countermine operations are different in winter environments. Mines are not as effective because of frozen fuses; however, mine detectors are also less effective. Hand emplaced mines are difficult to bury, but they may be concealed in snow. Mines placed onto hard packed snow or ice routes poses the greatest threat. Enemy mobility depends largely on weather conditions. If a thaw occurs, many areas which were previously solid ground will be untrafficable and will require maintenance. Additionally, combat engineers can be used effectively to close ice routes over waterways by demolitions. Unlike deserts, mountains and jungles, the urban environment is an ever-changing mix of natural and man-made obstacles. Attacks are easily canalized and surprised. The conditions favor the defender, for as Sun Tzu stated, "The worst policy is to attack cities. Attack cities only when there is no alternative."15 As the Soviets learned in World War II, engineer capabilities are extensively used in the urban environment. Engineer missions include clearing mines, clearning rubble, crossing gaps and breaching other types of obstacles. Earth moving blades and buckets to push debris, winches and booms to move obstacles, and demoltion teams are invaluable in the attack of prepared urban areas. During the urban defense, engineers are employed for emplacing point minefields and road craters, destroying bridges and overpasses, and constructing expedient obstacles using abandoned vehicles and rubble. Engineers can also provide technical advice on the employment of protective obstacles in and around structures. As evidenced in Beirut in 1975 after the bombing of the Marine barracks, simple well placed barriers can provide a substantial degree of protection.l6 When combat engineer functions are performed properly in offensive, defensive and special environment operations, combat effectiveness is enhanced. There is ample historical evidence of combat engineers being contributors to combined- arms teams. By all means, I have not discussed all the capabililties of the combat engineers. The fundamental combat engineers' role, however, has not changed. What has changed in the magnitude and speed with which engineering missions must be accomplished to keep pace with the tactical employment of modern weapons systems. Equipment such as the armored excavator is needed to allow the engineer to contribute his full potential to the MAGTF mission. May it be low, medium or high intensity warfare, the employment of combat engineers can enhance mobility, countermobility and survivability. The Commandant of the Marine Corps recently expressed in the 1990 posture statement his desire to activate, out of cadre status, the fourth combat engineer company in all the battalions. By this endorsement, the fundamental role of combat engineers as a force multiplier is reinforced. Combat engineers can contribute many places on the battlefield, while concentrating at the point where success in the central battle is most important. ENDNOTES 1 Janice Holt Giles, The Damned Engineers (Houghton Mifflin Company, Boston, MA, 1970), p. xiii. 2 U. S. Marine Corps, MAGTF Engineer Operations, OH-13 Draft, (Quantico, VA, 1989), p. 1-2. 3 U. S. Army, Department of the Army, Engineer Combat Operations, FM 5-100, (Ft. Belvoir, VA, 1988), p. 11. 4 Claude L. Roberts and Kent D. Steele, "Combat Engineers in Evolution," The Military Engineer, (Nov-Dec, 1979), p. 393. 5 Graham Turbiville, "Soviet Combat Engineers in Afghanistan," The Military Engineer, (Sept-Oct, 1988), p. 561. 6 Lt. Gen John J. Tolson, "Pegasus," Army, (Dec, 1971). 7 John C. Tillson, "The Forward Defense of Europe," Military Review, (May, 1981), p. 69. 8 Bill D. Ross, Iwo Jima, Legacy of Valor, (Vanguard Press, New York, 1985), p. 37. 9 Ross, p. 37. 10 Sidney Allinson, "War's Worst Day," Military Review, (June, 1989), p. 29. 11 Lt. Charles L. Toomey, "Obstacle Planning," Armor, (March-April, 1979), p. 44. 12 Fred Majdalany, The Battle of El Alamein, (J. B. Lippincott Company, Philadelphia, 1965), p. 64. 13 James Lucas, War in the Desert, (Beaufort Books, Inc., New York, 1982), p. 120. 14 Jim Wilson, Retreat Hell! (William Morrow and Co., Inc., New York, 1988), p. 91. 15 Samuel Griffith, Sun Tzu, The Art of War, (Oxford University Press, New York, 1963), p. 78. 16 Robert J. Moskin, The U. S. Marine Corps Story, (McGraw-Hill Book Company, New York, 1987), p. 741. BIBLIOGRAPHY Allinson, Sideny. "War's Worst Day," Military Review, (June, 1989), 227-232. Conklin, Willard D. "Cross-Flot Obstacle Employment," The Military Engineer, (Nov-Dec, 1988), 584-586. Davis, Franklin M., Col and Jones, Thomas T., LtCol. The U.S. Army Engineer-Fighting Elite, Franklin Watts, Inc., New York, 1967. Ellis, John. Eye-Deep in Hell, Pantheon Books, New York, 1976. Giles, Janice Holt. The Damned Engineers, Houghton Mifflin Company, Boston, MA, 1970. Griffith, Samuel. Sun Tzu; The Art of War, Oxford University Press, New York, 1963. Lucas, James. 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Army, Department of the Army, Engineer Combat Operations, FM 5-100, Ft Belvoir, VA, 1988. U. S. Marine Corps, MAGTF Engineer Operations, OH-13 (Draft), Quantico, VA, 1989. Wilson, Jim. Retreat Hell!, William Morrow and Co., Inc., New York, 1988. Copyrights = www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/1990/PFA.htm Used With Permission